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Abstract
In this paper, a characterization of authentication codes in terms of bipartite graphs is given. By using
such a characterization, two necessary and sufficient conditions for a minimal authentication code with
perfect secrecy are derived. The probabilities of a successful impersonation and of a successful substitution
attack are discussed. As a result, some (optimal) minimal authentication codes with perfect secrecy are
constructed from association schemes, from finite groups or from known authentication codes no matter
whether the known ones are with or without secrecy.
c© 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Two of the main applications of cryptography are the provision of secrecy and/or
authentication for messages. Shannon [18] introduced the theory of unconditional secrecy.
Simmons [19] developed an analogous theory of unconditional authentication. Massey [14] put
the two theories in a common setting and drew parallels between them. Let S, E andM be three
non-empty sets and let f : S × E →M be a map. The four tuple A = (S, E,M; f ) is called
an authentication code [19] if for each e ∈ E , the map f (·, e) : S →M defined by s 7→ f (s, e)
is injective.
For an authentication code A = (S, E,M; f ), we say that the sets S, E andM are the set of
source states, the set of encoding rules, and the set ofmessages, respectively. The map f is called
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the encoding map. If m = f (s, e) for s ∈ S, e ∈ E and m ∈ M, then we say that the source
state s is encoded into the message m by using the encoding rule e, and that for convenience, the
message m is valid under the encoding rule e. The cardinalities |S|, |E | and |M| are called the
size parameters of the code. An authentication code with the size parameters |S| = k, |E | = b
and |M| = v is simply denoted by an AC(k, b, v).
Authentication codes are used in communication channels where, besides the transmitter and
the receiver, there may be individuals who want to deceive the receiver by either impersonating
or substituting messages. To protect against these deceits, the transmitter–receiver may use an
authentication code which is publicly known and choose a fixed encoding rule e which is known
only by the transmitter and the receiver. The set of information which the transmitter would like
to transmit to the receiver should be identified with the set of source states of the code. Suppose
that the transmitter wants to send a source state s to the receiver. To do this, the transmitter first
encodes s into a message m using the chosen encoding rule e, i.e., m = f (s, e), and then sends
m to the receiver. After receiving a message m′, the receiver first has to judge whether m′ is
authentic, i.e., whether m′ is valid under the fixed encoding rule e. If m′ is valid under e, then
m′ is regarded as authentic and can be decoded by e to get the unique source state s′ such that
m′ = f (s′, e). Otherwise, m′ is regarded as a false one and is rejected by the receiver.
For any e ∈ E , letM(e) = { f (s, e)|s ∈ S} be the set of valid messages under e. Therefore
the map f (·, e) is a bijection from S onto M(e). Let fe denote the inverse map of f (·, e).
Furthermore, for any m ∈ M, let E(m) = {e ∈ E |m ∈ M(e)}. That is, E(m) is the set of
encoding rules under which m is valid.
Several characterizations of authentication codes have been obtained by combinatorial
designs [3,16,17,21] or by error-correcting codes [15]. In this paper, a characterization of
authentication codes in terms of bipartite graphs is given. By using such a characterization, two
necessary and sufficient conditions for a minimal authentication code with perfect secrecy are
derived. The probabilities of a successful impersonation and of a successful substitution attack
are discussed. As a result, some (optimal) minimal authentication codes with perfect secrecy are
constructed from association schemes, from finite groups or from known authentication codes no
matter whether the known ones are with or without secrecy.
2. Impersonation and substitution attacks
Suppose that there are independent probability distributions on the set S of source states
and on the set E of encoding rules. We write pS(s) and pE (e) for the a priori probabilities of
occurrence of the source state s ∈ S and the encoding rule e ∈ E , respectively. The probability
of a message to occur is completely dependent on the associated probabilities for source states
and encoding rules. Therefore, for every m ∈M, we always have that
pM(m) =
∑
e∈E(m),s= fe(m)
pS(s)pE (e).
We require that for every source state s, pS(s) > 0, for every encoding rule e, pE (e) > 0,
and for every message m, pM(m) > 0. This can easily be achieved by simply removing from
the sets under consideration those source states, encoding rules, and messages with probability
0 of occurrence. That is, the encoding map is assumed to be surjective. Moreover, we write
pS|M(s|m) for the conditional probability that source state s occurs if it is known that message
m was sent.
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We assume that the deceiver has the ability to impersonate the transmitter to send messages
to the receiver, or to tamper with the message sent by the transmitter. By impersonation it means
that the deceiver sends a message through the channel to the receiver and hopes that the receiver
will accept it as authentic, i.e., as a message sent by the transmitter. By substitution it means
that after the deceiver intercepts a message sent by the transmitter to the receiver, he/she sends
another message instead and hopes that the receiver will accept it as authentic. The objective
of the deceiver is to choose a message and send it to the receiver so that the probability of
deceiving the receiver, i.e., of causing the receiver to accept a message not sent by the transmitter
as authentic, is as large as possible. We denote by PI and PS , respectively, the largest probabilities
that the deceiver could deceive the receiver by impersonating and by substituting a message. We
call them the probabilities of a successful impersonation and of a successful substitution attack,
respectively. In other words, it is defined that
PI = max
m∈M
∑
e∈E(m)
pE (e), and PS = max
m,m′∈M
m′ 6=m
pM(m′|m), (1)
where pM(m′|m) is the probability that the message m′ is valid given that m has been observed.
Remark. Some authors choose to define PS as an average over the set of possible legitimate
messages rather than a maximum [3,16,19]. Lower bounds on PI and PS and lower bounds on
the number of encoding rules can be found in [3,12,16,19,21,22].
Throughout this paper we assume that the set of source states and the set of encoding rules
have a uniform probability distribution. Then it is easy to deduce that
PI = max
m∈M
|E(m)|
|E | and PS = maxm,m′∈M
m′ 6=m
|E(m) ∩ E(m′)|
|E(m)| . (2)
Count the number of pairs (e,m), such that e ∈ E , m ∈M and e ∈ E(m) in two ways, so that
we get
bk =
∑
m∈M
|E(m)|. (3)
Therefore there exists an m ∈M such that |E(m)| ≥ bk/v, which implies that PI ≥ k/v. From
Eq. (2), it is clear that PI achieves its lower bound k/v if and only if |E(m)| = bk/v for any
message m. Furthermore, if PI = k/v, then PS ≥ v/(bk) since there exist messages m and m′
such that |E(m)∩E(m′)| ≥ 1. This gives the proof of the following well-known result [16,19,22].
Theorem 1. For any AC(k, b, v), we have that PI ≥ k/v. The equality holds if and only if
|E(m)| = bk/v for any message m ∈M. Furthermore, if PI = k/v, then PS ≥ v/(bk).
3. Authentication codes and bipartite graphs
Let G be a simple undirected graph with vertex set V (G) and edge set E(G). For any vertex
v ∈ V (G), the neighbor of v, denoted by N (v), is the set of vertices which are adjacent to v. The
cardinality of N (v) is called the degree of v. A graph G is called regular if every vertex of G has
the same degree. A graph G is bipartite (with bipartition (X, Y )) if the vertex set V (G) can be
partitioned into two subsets X and Y so that every edge has one end in X and one end in Y . A
subset M of E(G) is called a matching in the graph G if no two of its elements are adjacent in G.
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A matching M is called a maximum one if G has no matching M ′ with |M ′| > |M |, and M is
perfect if every vertex of G is incident with some edge in M . For more information on graphs,
the reader is referred to Bondy and Murty [2].
Let A = (S, E,M; f ) be an AC(k, b, v). Construct a graph G(A) as follows:
V (G(A)) = E ∪M,
E(G(A)) = {{e,m}|e ∈ E,m ∈M and m ∈M(e)}.
Then G(A) is a bipartite graph and the degree of every vertex in E is k. It is called the bipartite
graph induced from A.
Conversely, suppose that G is a bipartite graph with bipartition (X, Y ) and the degree of every
vertex in X is k. Given an arbitrary set S with k elements. For each x ∈ X , let ex be a bijection
from S to N (x). Set E = X andM = Y . Define the encoding map f as f (s, x) = ex (s) for
s ∈ S and x ∈ E . ThenA(G) = (S, E,M; f ) is an AC(k, |X |, |Y |). This authentication code is
called the induced one from the graph G.
Note that the bipartite graph induced from an authentication code is unique. But there are
(k!)|X | authentication codes induced from one bipartite graph since there are k! choices for each
ex . Two authentication codes A1 = (S1, E1,M1; f1) and A2 = (S2, E2,M2; f2) are said to
be homovalid if they are induced from the same bipartite graph. The reason is that for any
e ∈ E1 = E2,M1(e) =M2(e) = N (e), i.e., the sets of valid messages under the same encoding
rule of these two authentication codes are the same. Moreover, if authentication codes A1 and
A2 are homovalid, then for any m ∈M1 =M2, we have E1(m) = E2(m) = N (m). Therefore
the following theorem on homovalid authentication codes is immediate.
Theorem 2. Homovalid authentication codes induce the same bipartite graph and homovalid
authentication codes have the same probabilities of a successful impersonation and of a
successful substitution attack.
4. Minimal authentication codes with perfect secrecy
Godlewski and Mitchell [8] gave the definition of several cryptosystems with secrecy (such as
U (L)-secrecy, S(L)-secrecy, O(L)-secrecy, or M(L)-secrecy) and the characterization of such
systems with minimum number of encoding rules. In the following, the definition and some
results on U (L)-secrecy are reviewed.
A subset M′ of M is allowable if there exists an encoding rule e such that M′ ⊆ M(e).
Given L ≥ 1, an AC(k, b, v) is said to provide unordered perfect L-fold secrecy (U (L)-secrecy)
if, for every allowable L-subset M′ of M and for every L-subset S ′ of S, pS|M(S ′|M′) =
pS(S ′).
Theorem 3 ([8]). If an AC(k, b, v) provides U (L)-secrecy, then b ≥ (v/k) ·
(
k
L
)
. Moreover, if
b = (v/k) ·
(
k
L
)
and L ≥ 2, then for any two encoding rules e1 and e2 eitherM(e1) =M(e2)
orM(e1) andM(e2) are disjoint.
It is easy to prove that if an AC(k, b, v) provides U (L)-secrecy and b = (v/k) ·
(
k
L
)
then
PI achieves its lower bound k/v. But if L ≥ 2 in addition then PS = 1. Therefore, in order to
provide protection from the substitution attack, we are interested in AC(k, b, v)’s which provide
U (1)-secrecy. Note that when L = 1 all cryptosystems with secrecy defined in [8] coincide
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and in fact equate to Shannon’s notion of perfect secrecy [18]. So we call an AC(k, b, v) which
provides U (1)-secrecy an authentication code with perfect secrecy. It is known from Theorem 3
that b ≥ v for any AC(k, b, v) with perfect secrecy. Such a code is said to be minimal if b
achieves its lower bound v. The following theorem (Lemma 4.1 in [8]) gives a characterization
of a minimal authentication code with perfect secrecy.
Theorem 4 ([8]). Let (S, E,M; f ) be an authentication code. Then it is minimal with perfect
secrecy if and only if |E | = |M| and for any s ∈ S and any m ∈M, there is an e ∈ E such that
m = f (s, e). In fact, such e exists uniquely.
Let A be a minimal AC(k, b, v) with perfect secrecy, then |E(m)| = k for any m ∈M. Thus
the bipartite graph G(A) induced fromA is k-regular. Conversely, minimal authentication codes
with perfect secrecy can be constructed from k-regular bipartite graphs as the following theorem
indicates.
Theorem 5. If there is a k-regular bipartite graph with 2n vertices, then there exists a minimal
AC(k, n, n) with perfect secrecy.
Proof. Suppose that G is a k-regular bipartite graph of order 2n with bipartition (X, Y ). It is clear
that |X | = |Y | = n. By Konig’s Theorem [13], the graph G is k-edge-colorable. Let G be edge-
colored by k different colors, say c1, c2, . . . , ck . Set S = {c1, c2, . . . , ck}, E = X andM = Y .
For any x ∈ X = E , define ex : S → N (x) by ex (s) = m for any s ∈ S, where {x,m} is an edge
of the graph G colored by s. Then, ex is a bijection which implies that A(G) = (S, E,M; f )
is an authentication code as in Section 3. Moreover, for any m ∈ M and any s ∈ S, there is a
unique edge incident with m which has color s. The other end of this edge is an encoding rule
e satisfying m = f (s, e). By Theorem 4, the constructed authentication code is a minimal one
with perfect secrecy. 
In [21], the technique of using edge-colorings of graphs to construct authentication codes was
used. From the proof of Theorem 5, the main step for constructing a minimal authentication code
with perfect secrecy from a regular bipartite graph G is giving an edge-coloring of this graph.
There are a number of specific and relatively simple algorithms to find a maximum matching E1
(with k edges) in G. For example, the breadth-first phased maximum matching algorithm runs in
O(kn
3
2 ) time on a k-regular bipartite graph G with 2n vertices to find a maximum matching [9].
We paint the edges of this matching with color c1. Then consider the (k − 1)-regular bipartite
graph obtained by deleting the edges of E1 from G, and repeat the procedure. Thus an edge-
coloring of the bipartite graph G can be obtained in O(k2n
3
2 ) time, i.e., in a polynomial time
in n. Noting that we always assume that k  v for an AC(k, b, v), so k should be sufficiently
smaller than n.
Suppose thatA is an authentication code whose induced bipartite graph G(A) is regular. Then
a minimal authentication code with perfect secrecy A′ can be constructed from this graph. That
is, the two codes A and A′ are homovalid. This proves the following theorem.
Theorem 6. An authentication code or one which is homovalid to it is minimal with perfect
secrecy if and only if its induced bipartite graph is regular.
If an AC(k, b, v) has b = v and PI = k/v, then |E(m)| = k for any message m. Thus the
induced bipartite graph is regular. The following theorem is immediate from Theorem 6.
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Theorem 7. An authentication code AC(k, b, v) or one which is homovalid to it is minimal with
perfect secrecy if and only if b = v and its probability of a successful impersonation attack PI
achieves its lower bound k/v.
From Theorem 1, for any minimal AC(k, b, v) with perfect secrecy, we have that PS ≥ 1/k.
Also it is well known [19] that PS ≥ (k−1)/(v−1). A minimal AC(k, b, v) with perfect secrecy
is called optimal if PS = max{1/k, (k − 1)/(v − 1)}. It is clear that a minimal authentication
code with perfect secrecy has PS = 1/k if and only if there are no two distinct messages m and
m′ such that |E(m) ∩ E(m′)| ≥ 2. Therefore we have the following theorem.
Theorem 8. A minimal authentication code with perfect secrecy has PS = 1/k if and only if
there is no 4-cycles in its induced bipartite graph. Or equivalently, if and only if the girth of its
induced bipartite graph is at least 6.
5. Construction of minimal authentication codes with perfect secrecy
From Theorem 5, the construction of minimal authentication codes with perfect secrecy is
equivalent to the construction of regular bipartite graphs. In this section, we show how to derive
minimal authentication codes with perfect secrecy from association schemes, from finite groups
or from known authentication codes.
5.1. Minimal authentication codes with perfect secrecy derived from association schemes
Let X be a finite set, and let Ri (0 ≤ i ≤ d) be subsets of X × X satisfying the following
conditions:
(i) R0 = {(x, x)|x ∈ X}.
(ii) X × X = ∪di=0 Ri , Ri ∩ R j = φ (i 6= j).
(iii) For any 0 ≤ i ≤ d , there is an i ′ (0 ≤ i ′ ≤ d) such that
t Ri = {(y, x)|(x, y) ∈ Ri } = Ri ′ .
(iv) For any i , j , k (0 ≤ i, j, k ≤ d), the number of z ∈ X such that (x, z) ∈ Ri and (z, y) ∈ R j
is independent of the choices of x and y whenever (x, y) ∈ Rk . This number is denoted by
pki j .
(v) For any i , j , k (0 ≤ i, j, k ≤ d),
pki j = pkji .
Then the configuration χ = (X, {Ri }0≤i≤d) is called an association scheme [1] on the set X
with d associate classes. Non-negative integers pki j (0 ≤ i, j, k ≤ d) are called the intersection
numbers of the association scheme χ .
Let ki = p0i i ′ , i.e., the number of z ∈ X such that (x, z) ∈ Ri for a fixed x ∈ X . It is
independent of the choice of x and is called the valency of Ri . The numbers n = |X |, ki and pki j
(0 ≤ i, j, k ≤ d) are called the parameters of the association scheme χ .
Authentication codes constructed by association schemes with 2 associate classes were given
in [20]. In this subsection, a general construction of authentication codes based on association
schemes is presented. Let χ = (X, {Ri }0≤i≤d) be an association scheme with parameters n, ki ,
pki j (0 ≤ i, j, k ≤ d). Fix an ` (1 ≤ ` ≤ d) such that k` > 1. Construct a bipartite graph, having
bipartition (X, X), where {x, y}(x, y ∈ X) is an edge if and only if (x, y) ∈ R`. It is clear that
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this graph is a regular bipartite graph with valency k`. Therefore, a minimal authentication code
with perfect secrecy can be derived from this graph by Theorem 5. Now let m1, m2 ∈ X be
two distinct valid messages under an encoding rule and let (m1,m2) ∈ R j . Then the number of
encoding rules under which m1 and m2 are valid simultaneously is equal to the number of z ∈ X
such that (z,m1) ∈ R` and (z,m2) ∈ R`. This number is p j`′`. That is, |E(m1) ∩ E(m2)| = p j`′`.
From Eq. (2) in Section 2, the following theorem is immediate.
Theorem 9. Assume that there is an association scheme with parameters n, ki , pki j (0 ≤ i, j,
k ≤ d). For any ` with k` > 1, there is a minimal AC(k`, n, n) with perfect secrecy and the
probabilities of a successful impersonation and of a successful substitution of the code are
PI = k`n and PS =
1
k`
max
1≤ j≤d
p j
`′`
respectively.
Example. Let A be an alphabet of q symbols {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}. Let X be the set of all m-tuples
of elements of A. For x, y ∈ X and 0 ≤ i ≤ m, define (x, y) ∈ Ri if and only if x and y differ
in just i coordinates. Then (X, {Ri }0≤i≤m) is an association scheme with m associate classes.
This scheme is called the Hamming scheme. Setting ` = 1, the corresponding parameters of this
scheme are
n = qm, k1 = m(q − 1), p111 = q − 2, p211 = 2,
p311 = · · · = pm11 = 0.
Therefore, for any q ≥ 4 and m, there is a minimal AC(m(q − 1), qm, qm) with perfect secrecy.
The probabilities of a successful impersonation and of a successful substitution of this code are
PI = m(q − 1)qm and PS =
q − 2
m(q − 1)
respectively. When m = 2 and q = 4, we get a minimal optimal AC(6, 16, 16) with perfect
secrecy.
Example. Let Fq be the finite field with q elements, where q is a power of an odd prime. Choose
a fixed non-square element z of F ∗q . Let n = 2ν + δ, δ = 0, 1 or 2. (Here we allow two different
expressions of even n.) Put
Sδ =
 0 I (ν)I (ν) 0
Γ
 ,
where I (ν) is the identity matrix of order ν and
Γ =

φ if δ = 0,
(1) if δ = 1,(
1
−z
)
if δ = 2.
Let ν ≥ 2, and let v0 be a fixed isotropic vector in the (2ν + δ)-dimensional orthogonal space
F 2ν+δq over Fq , i.e., v0SδvT0 = 0. Put
X = {v ∈ F2ν+δq | v0SδvT = 1, vSδvT = 0}.
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Define relations on X as follows: for x, y ∈ X , (x, y) ∈ R0 if x = y, (x, y) ∈ Ri if xSδyT = gi ,
1 ≤ i ≤ q − 1, where g is a fixed primitive element of Fq , and (x, y) ∈ Rq if x 6= y and
xSδyT = 0. Then χ = (X, {Ri }0≤i≤q) is an association scheme with q associate classes (see [5]).
For example, if ` = q , then we have a minimal AC(kq , n, n) with perfect secrecy, where
kq = (qν−1 − 1)(qν−2+δ + 1), n = q2(ν−1)+δ.
The probabilities of a successful impersonation and of a successful substitution of this code are
PI = (q
ν−1 − 1)(qν−2+δ + 1)
q2(ν−1)+δ
and
PS =

q2ν−4 + qν−1 − qν−2 − 2
q2ν−3 + qν−1 − qν−2 − 1 if δ = 0,
qν−2
qν−1 − 1 if δ = 1,
qν−1
qν + 1 if δ = 2,
respectively. Moreover, when either ν > 3 or ν = 2, 3 with δ = 1, 2, the code is nearly optimal.
5.2. Minimal authentication codes with perfect secrecy derived from finite groups
From any k-regular graph, we can get a k-regular bipartite graph by the following covering
technique.
Let G be a k-regular graph with vertex set V (G) = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}. Construct graph G˜ as
V (G˜) = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} ∪ {v′1, v′2, . . . , v′n}
and vi and v′j are adjacent in G˜ if and only if vi and v j are adjacent in the graph G. Then G˜ is a
k-regular bipartite graph. It is called the canonical double covering of G. It is clear that there is
a 4-cycle in G˜ if and only if there is a 4-cycle in G. Therefore we have the following theorem.
Theorem 10. If there is a k-regular graph G with n vertices, then there is a minimal AC(k, n, n)
with perfect secrecy. Furthermore, this authentication code has PS = 1/k if and only if there is
no 4-cycles in the graph G.
From any finite group, a regular graph can be constructed as follows. Let Γ be a finite group
and let S be a subset of Γ such that 1 6∈ S and for any s ∈ S, s−1 ∈ S. The Cayley graph
Cay(Γ , S) on Γ with connector set S is defined as V (Cay(Γ , S)) = Γ and two vertices g and h
are adjacent if and only if g−1h ∈ S. It is clear that Cay(Γ , S) is an |S|-regular graph with |Γ |
vertices. Using the covering technique, regular bipartite graphs can be constructed by this Cayley
graph Cay(Γ , S). Therefore, minimal authentication codes with perfect secrecy can be obtained
from finite groups.
Example. Let q be an odd prime power, and let Fq be the finite field with q elements. Then the
set Γ = Fq × Fq with operation
(a, b) ? (a′, b′) = (a + a′, b + b′ + aa′)
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becomes a group of order q2 with identity (0, 0) [10]. Let S be a line from the affine plane
AG(Fq) which are not through the point (0, 0). That is, given that a, b ∈ Fq with (a, b) 6= (0, 0)
and c ∈ F∗q , S = {(x, y)|ax + by = c}. Then the Cayley graph Cay(Γ , S) is a q-regular
graph with q2 vertices. Therefore an AC(q, q2, q2) with perfect secrecy is constructed. The
probabilities of a successful impersonation and of a successful substitution attack of it are
P0 = P1 = 1/q . It is an optimal minimal authentication code with perfect secrecy.
5.3. Minimal authentication codes with perfect secrecy derived from known authentication codes
The encoding matrix [21] of an AC(k, b, v) is a b × k matrix, where the rows are indexed
by encoding rules, the columns are indexed by source states, and the entry in row e and column
s is the message m = f (s, e). So, the set of entries in row e is just M(e). It is clear that an
authentication code is uniquely determined by its encoding matrix. An authentication code is
called Cartesian if any message m observed in the channel determines a unique source state s.
In other word, for any message m, there is a unique source state s such that m = f (s, e) for any
e ∈ E(m). A Cartesian authentication code provides no secrecy. Many constructions of Cartesian
authentication codes have appeared (see [4,6,7,11,12,21,23,24]).
From Theorem 7, if A is an AC(k, v, v) such that PI = k/v, then there is a minimal
authentication code with perfect secrecyA′ which is homovalid toA. In fact, the encoding matrix
ofA′ can be got from that ofA by reordering the entries in each row suitably. From Section 4, we
know that this can be done in a polynomial time in v. Therefore, from any Cartesian AC(k, v, v)
with PI = k/v which provides no secrecy, a minimal authentication code with perfect secrecy
can be constructed. Moreover, they have the same probabilities of successful attacks.
Example. By Theorem 2 of [6], for any prime power q, and any positive integers ν
and s, there is a Cartesian AC(q2s(ν−s), qs(2ν−s), qs(2ν−s)). Thus, there is a minimal
AC(q2s(ν−s), qs(2ν−s), qs(2ν−s)) with perfect secrecy. The probabilities of a successful
impersonation and of a successful substitution attack of it are PI = 1/qs2 and PS = 1/qs .
This code is (nearly) optimal when s = 1.
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